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Methodological discussions often oversimplify by distinguishing between “the”
quantitative and “the” qualitative paradigm and by arguing that quantitative research
processes are organized in a linear, deductive way while qualitative research processes
are organized in a circular and inductive way. When comparing two selected quantitative
traditions (survey research and big data research) with three qualitative research traditions
(qualitative content analysis, grounded theory and social-science hermeneutics), a
much more complex picture is revealed: The only differentiation that can be upheld is
how “objectivity” and “intersubjectivity” are defined. In contrast, all research traditions
agree that partiality is endangering intersubjectivity and objectivity. Countermeasures are
self-reflexion and transforming partiality into perspectivity by using social theory. Each
research tradition suggests further countermeasures such as falsification, triangulation,
parallel coding, theoretical sensitivity or interpretation groups. When looking at the overall
organization of the research process, the distinction between qualitative and quantitative
research cannot be upheld. Neither is there a continuum between quantitative research,
content analysis, grounded theory and social-science hermeneutics. Rather, grounded
theory starts inductively and with a general research question at the beginning of analysis
which is focused during selective coding. The later research process is organized in a
circular way, making strong use of theoretical sampling. All other traditions start research
deductively and formulate the research question as precisely as possible at the beginning
of the analysis and then organize the overall research process in a linear way. In contrast,
data analysis is organized in a circular way. One consequence of this paper is that mixing
and combining qualitative and quantitative methods becomes both easier (because the
distinction is not as grand as it seems at first sight) andmore difficult (because some tricky
issues of mixing specific to mixing specific types of methods are usually not addressed
in mixed methods discourse).
Keywords: research process, mixed methods, survey research, big data, qualitative content analysis, grounded
theory, social-science hermeneutics, objectivity
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INTRODUCION
Since the 1920s, two distinct traditions of doing social science
research have developed and consolidated (Kelle, 2008, p. 26
ff.; Baur et al., 2017, p. 3; Reichertz, 2019), which are typically
depicted as the “qualitative” and the “quantitative” paradigm
(Bryman, 1988). Both paradigms have a long tradition of
demarcating themselves from each other by ignoring each other
at best or criticizing as well as pejoratively devaluating the
respective “other” tradition at worst (Baur et al., 2017, 2018,
pp. 8–9; Kelle, 2017; Baur and Knoblauch, 2018). Regardless,
few authors make the effort of actually defining the difference
between the paradigms. Instead, most methodological texts
in both research traditions make implicit assumptions about
the properties of “qualitative” and “quantitative” research. If
one sums up both these (a) implicit assumptions and (b) the
few attempts of defining what “qualitative” and “quantitative”
research is, the result is a rather crude and oversimplified picture.
“Qualitative research” is typically depicted as combination of
the following elements (Ametowobla et al., 2017, pp. 737–776;
Baur and Blasius, 2019):
– an “interpretative” epistemological stance (e.g., Knoblauch
et al., 2018) which is associated e.g., with phenomenology or
social constructivism (Knoblauch and Pfadenhauer, 2018) or
some branches of pragmatism (Johnson et al., 2017);
– a research process that is circular or spiral (Strübing, 2014);
– single case studies (Baur and Lamnek, 2017a) or small
theoretically and purposely drawn samples meaning that
relatively few cases are analyzed (Behnke et al., 2010,
pp. 194–210);
– for these cases, a lot of data are collected, e.g., by qualitative
interviews (Helfferich, 2019), ethnography (Knoblauch and
Vollmer, 2019) or so-called “natural” data, i.e., qualitative
process-produced data such as visual data (Rose, 2016) or
digital data such as web videos (Traue and Schünzel, 2019),
websites (Schünzel and Traue, 2019) or blogs (Schmidt, 2019).
In all these cases, this means that a lot of information per case
is analyzed;
– both the data and the data collection process are open-ended
and less structured than in quantitative research;
– data are typically prepared and organized either by hand or
by using qualitative data analysis software (such as NVivo,
MAXqda or Atlas/ti);
– data analysis procedures themselves are suitable for the more
unstructured nature of the data.
In contrast, “quantitative research” is seen as a
combination of (Ametowobla et al., 2017, pp. 752–754;
Baur and Blasius, 2019):
– a “positivist” research stance;
– a linear research process (Baur, 2009a);
– large random samples meaning that many cases are analyzed;
– relatively little information per case, collected via (in
comparison to qualitative research) few variables;
– data are collected in a highly structured format, e.g., using
surveys (Groves et al., 2009; Blasius and Thiessen, 2012;
Baur, 2014) or mass data (Baur, 2009a) which recently have
also been called “big data” (Foster et al., 2017; König et al.,
2018) and which may comprise e.g., webserver logs and log
files (Schmitz and Yanenko, 2019), quantified user-generated
information on the internet such as Twitter communication
(Mayerl and Faas, 2019) as well as public administrational data
(Baur, 2009b; Hartmann and Lengerer, 2019; Salheiser, 2019)
and other social bookkeeping data (Baur, 2009a);
– the whole data collection process is highly structured and as
standardized as possible;
– data are prepared by building a data base and analyzed using
statistical packages (like R, STATA or SPSS) or advanced
programming techniques (e.g., Python);
– data are analyzed using diverse statistical (Baur and Lamnek,
2017b) or text mining techniques (Riebling, 2017).
Once these supposed differences are spelled out, it immediately
becomes obvious how oversimplified they are because in social
science research practice, the distinction between the data types
is much more fluent. For example, “big data” are usually
mixed data, containing both standardized elements (Mayerl
and Faas, 2019) such as log files (Schmitz and Yanenko,
2019) and qualitative elements such as texts (Nam, 2019) or
videos (Traue and Schünzel, 2019). Accordingly, it is unclear,
if text mining is really a “quantitative” method or rather a
“qualitative”method.While the fluidity between “qualitative” and
“quantitative” research becomes immediately obvious in big data
analyses, this issue has also been lingering in “traditional” social
science research for decades. For example, many quantitative
researchers simultaneously analyse several thousand variables.
Survey research has a long tradition of using qualitative methods
for pretesting and evaluating survey questions (Langfeldt and
Goltz, 2017; Uher, 2018). Almost all questionnaires contain open-
ended questions with non-standardized answers which have to
be coded afterwards (Züll and Menold, 2019), and if interviewees
or interviewers do not agree with the questionnaire, they might
add comments on the side—so-called marginalia (Edwards et al.,
2017). During data analysis, results of statistical analyses are often
“qualified” when interpreting results. While Kuckartz (2017)
provides many current examples for qualification of quantitative
data, a well-known older example is Pierre Bourdieu’s analysis
of social space by using correspondence analysis. Likewise,
qualitative research has a long tradition of “quantification” of
research results (Vogl, 2017), and similarly to text mining, it is
unclear, if qualitative content analysis is a “quantitative” method
or rather a “qualitative” method.
Despite these obvious overlaps and fluent borders between
“qualitative” and “quantitative” research, the oversimplified view
of two different “worlds” or “cultures” (Reichertz, 2019) of social
science research practice is upheld in methodological discourse.
Accordingly, methodological discourse has reacted increasingly
by attempting to combine these traditions via mixed methods
research since the early 1980s (Baur et al., 2017). However,
although today many differentiated suggestions exist how to best
organize a mixed methods research process (Schoonenboom and
Johnson, 2017), mixed methods research in a way consolidates
this simple distinction between “qualitative” and “quantitative”
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research, as in all attempts of mixing methods, qualitative
and quantitative methods still seem distinct methods—which is
exactly why it is assumed that they need to be “mixed.” Moreover,
many qualitative researchers complain that current suggestions
for mixing methods ignore important principles of qualitative
research and instead enforce the quantitative research logic on
qualitative research processes, thus robbing qualitative research
of its hugest advantages and transforming it into a lacking version
of quantitative research (Baur et al., 2017, for some problems
arising when trying to take qualitative research logics seriously
in mixed methods research, see Akremi, 2017; Baur and Hering,
2017; Hense, 2017).
In this paper, I will address this criticism by focusing on
social science research design and the organization of the research
process. I will show that the distinction between “qualitative” and
“quantitative” research is oversimplified. I will do this by breaking
up the debate about “the” qualitative and “the” quantitative
research process up in two ways:
Firstly, if one looks closely, there is not “one way” of doing
qualitative or quantitative research. Instead, in both research
traditions, there are sub-schools, which are characterized by
the same degree of ignoring themselves or infighting as can be
observed between the qualitative and quantitative tradition.
– More specifically, “quantitative research” can be at least
differentiated into classical survey research (Groves et al., 2009;
Blasius and Thiessen, 2012; Baur, 2014) and big data analysis of
process-generated mass data (“Massendaten”) (Baur, 2009a).
Survey data are a good example for research-elicited data,
meaning that data are produced by researchers solely for
research purposes which is why researchers (at least in
theory) can control every step of the research process and
therefore also the types of errors that occur. In contrast,
process-produced mass data are not produced for research
purposes but are a side product of social processes (Baur,
2009a). A classic example for process-produced mass data
are public administrational data which are produced by
governments, public administrations, companies and other
organizations in order to conduct their everyday business
(Baur, 2009b; Hartmann and Lengerer, 2019; Salheiser, 2019).
For example, governments collect census data for planning
purposes; pension funds collect data on their customers
in order to assess who later has acquired which types of
claims; companies collect data on their customers in order
to send them bills etc. Digital data (Foster et al., 2017;
König et al., 2018), too, are typically side-products of social
processes and therefore count as process-produced data. For
example, each time we access the internet, log files are created
that protocol our internet activities (Schmitz and Yanenko,
2019), and in many social media, users will leave quantified
information—a typical example is Twitter communication
(Mayerl and Faas, 2019). Process-produced data can also be
analyzed by researchers. In contrast to survey data, they have
the advantage of being non-reactive, and for many research
questions (e.g., in economic sociology) they are the only
data type available (Baur, 2011). However, as they are not
produced for research purposes, researchers cannot control
the research process or types of errors that may occur during
data collection—researchers can only assess how the data
are biased before analyzing them (Baur, 2009a). Regardless
of researchers using research-elicited or process-produced
data, many quantitative researchers aim at replicating results
in order to test, if earlier research can uphold scrutiny1.
Therefore, one can distinguish between primary research (the
original study conducted by the first researcher), replication
(when a second researcher tries to produce the same results
with the same or different data) and meta-analysis (where a
researcher compares all results of various studies on a specific
topic in order to summarize findings, see Weiß and Wagner,
2019). In contrast, for secondary analysis, researchers re-use
an existing data set in order to answer a different research
question than the primary researcher asked. As can be seen
from this short overview, there are many diverging research
traditions within quantitative research, and accordingly, there
are many differences and unresolved issues between these
traditions. However, for the purpose of this paper, I will
subsume them under the term “quantitative research”, as I
have shown in Baur (2009a) that at least regarding the overall
organization of research processes, these various schools of
quantitative research largely resemble each other.
– The situation is not as simple for “qualitative research”:
Not only are there more than 50 traditions of qualitative
research (Kuckartz, 2010), but these traditions widely diverge
in their epistemological assumptions and the way they do
research. In order to be able to better discuss these differences
and commonalties, in this paper, I will focus on three
qualitative research traditions, which have been selected
for being as different as possible in the way they organize
the research process, namely “qualitative content analysis”
(Schreier, 2012; Kuckartz, 2014, 2018; Mayring, 2014; see
also Ametowobla et al., 2017, pp. 776–786), “social-science
hermeneutics” (“sozialwissenschaftliche Hermeneutik”),
which is sometimes also called “hermeneutical sociology of
knowledge” (“hermeneutische Wissenssoziologie”) (Reichertz,
2004a; Herbrik, 2018; Kurt and Herbrik, 2019; see also
Ametowobla et al., 2017, pp. 786–790) and “grounded theory”
(Corbin and Strauss, 1990; Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Clarke,
2005; Charmaz, 2006; Strübing, 2014, 2018, 2019). Please note
that within these traditions, some authors try to combine and
integrate these diverse qualitative approaches. However, in
order to be able to explore the commonalities and differences
better, I will focus on the more “pure,” i.e., original forms of
these qualitative paradigms.
Secondly, while it is not possible of speaking of “the” qualitative
and “the” quantitative research, it is neither possible of speaking of
“the” research process in the sense that there is only one question
to be asked when designing social inquiry. Instead, when it comes
to discussing the differences between qualitative and quantitative
research, at least six issues have to be discussed:
1Note that for many social phenomena, replication is not possible due to the nature
of the research object, e.g. for macro-social or fast-changing social phenomena
(Kelle, 2017) – see below for more details.
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1. How is researchers’ perspectivity handled during the
research process?
2. How can intersubjectivity be achieved, and what does
“objectivity” mean in this context?
3. When and how is the research question focused?
4. Does the research process start deductively or inductively?
5. Is the order of the diverse research phases (sampling, data
collection, data preparation, data analysis) organized in a
linear or circular way?
6. Is data analysis itself organized in a linear or circular way?
In the following sections, I will discuss for each of these
six issues how the four research traditions (quantitative
research, qualitative content analysis, grounded theory,
social-science hermeneutics) handle them and how they
resemble and differ from each other. I will conclude the
paper by discussing what this means for the distinction
between qualitative and quantitative research as well as mixed
methods research.
HANDLING PERSPECTIVITY BY USING
SOCIAL THEORY
There are many different types of philosophies of sciences and
associated epistemologies, e.g., pragmatism (Johnson et al., 2017),
phenomenology (Meidl, 2009, pp. 51–98), critical rationalism
(Popper, 1935), critical theory (Adorno, 1962/1969/1993;
Habermas, 1981), radical constructivism (von Glasersfeld, 1994),
relationism (Kuhn, 1962), postmodernism (Lyotard, 1979/2009),
anarchism (Feyerabend, 1975), epistemological historism
(Hübner, 2002), fallibism (Lakatos, 1976) or evolutionary
epistemology (Riedl, 1985). Moreover, debates within these
different schools of thought are often rather refined and
organized in sub-schools, as Johnson et al. (2017) illustrate for
pragmatism. Regardless, current social science debates simply
crudely distinguish between “positivism” and “constructivism”.
While this is yet another oversimplification which would be
worth deconstructing, for the context of this paper it suffices to
note that this distinction is rooted in the demarcation between
the natural sciences (“Naturwissenschaften”) and humanities
(“Geisteswissenschaften”) in the nineteenth century. It has been
the occasion of several debates on the nature of (social) science
as well as the methodological and epistemological consequences
to be drawn from this definition of (social) science (e.g., Merton,
1942/1973; Smelser, 1976; for an overview see Baur et al., 2018).
In current social science debates, the “quantitative paradigm”
is often depicted as being “positivist”, while the “qualitative
paradigm” is depicted as being “constructivist” or “interpretative”
(e.g., Bryman, 1988) which has consequences on howwe conceive
social science research processes.
One of the issues debated is, whether social reality can
be grasped “per se” as a fact. This so-called “positive
stance” was taken e.g., by eighteenth and nineteenth century
cameralistics and statistics who collected census and other public
administrational data in order to improve governing practices
and competition between nation states and who strongly believed
that their statistical categories were exact images of social reality
(Baur et al., 2018). This “positive stance” was also taken e.g., by
the representatives of the German School of History who claimed
that facts should speak for themselves and focused on a history of
events (“Ereignisgeschichte”) (Baur, 2005 pp. 25–56).
The criticism of these research practices of both the natural
sciences (exemplified by early statistics) and the humanities
(exemplified by historical research) goes back to the nineteenth
century. For example, early German-language sociologists such
as Max Weber criticized both traditions because they argued
that no “facts” exist that speak for themselves, as both the
original data producers of sociological or historical data and
the researchers using these data see them from a specific
perspective and subjectively (re-)interpret them. In other words:
Data are highly constructed. If researchers do not reflect this
construction process, they unconsciously (re-)produce their
own and the data producer’s worldview. As in the nineteenth
century, both statistical data and historical documents were
mostly originally produced by or for the powerful, nineteenth
century statistics and humanities unconsciously analyzed society
from their own perspective and the perspective of the powerful
(Baur, 2008, p. 192). Consequently, early historical science
served to politically legitimate historically evolved orders
(Wehler, 1980, p. 8, 44, 53–54).
These arguments are reflected in current debates, e.g., by
the debates on how social-science methodology in general and
statistics in particular are tools of power (e.g., Desrosières,
2002). They are also reflected in postmodern critiques
that every research takes place from a specific worldview
(“Standortgebundenheit der Forschung”), which is a particular
problem for social science research, as researchers are always
also part of the social realities they analyze, meaning that their
particular subjectivity may distort research. More specifically, as
academia today is dominated by white middle-class men from
the Global North, social science research is systematically in
danger of creating blind spots for other social realities (Connell,
2007; Mignolo, 2011; Shih and Lionnet, 2011)—an issue Merton
(1942/1973) had already pointed out.
At the same time, it does not make sense to dissolve social
science research in extreme “constructivism”, as this will make
it impossible to assess the validity of research and to distinguish
between solid research and “fake news” or “alternative facts”
(Baur and Knoblauch, 2018).
In other words: The distinction between “positivism” and
“constructivism” creates a dilemma between either denying the
existence of different worldviews or abolishing the standards of
good scientific practice. In order to avoid this deadlock, early
German sociologists (e.g., Max Weber) and later generations
of historians reframed this question: The problem is not, if
subjectivity influences perception (it does!), but how it frames
perception (Baur, 2005, 2008; Baur et al., 2018). In other
words, one can distinguish between different types of subjectivity,
which have different effects on the research process. In modern
historical sciences, at least three forms of subjectivity are
distinguished (Koselleck, 1977):
1. Partiality (“Parteilichkeit”): As shown above, subjectivity can
distort research because researchers are so entangled in their
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own value system that they systematically misinterpret or even
peculate data. This kind of subjectivity has to be avoided at
all costs.
2. “Verstehen”: Subjectivity is necessary to understand the
meaning of human action (and data in general), so in this
sense, it is an important resource for social science research,
especially in social-science hermeneutics.
3. Perspectivity (“Perspektivität”): Subjectivity is also a
prerequisite for grasping reality. The first important steps
in social science research are framing a research question as
“relevant” and “interesting”, addressing this question from a
certain theoretical stance and selecting data appropriate for
answering that question.
Starting from this distinction, early German sociologists argued
that—as one cannot avoid perspectivity—it is important to reflect
it and make it explicit. And one does this by making strong use of
social theory and methodology when designing and conducting
social science research (Baur, 2008, pp. 192–193). The point
about this is that social science research still creates blind spots
(because reality can never be analyzed as a whole) but as these
blind spots are made explicit, they become debatable and can be
openly addressed in future research.
If one reframes the question, the debate between “positivism”
and “constructivism” implodes, as the comparison of the four
research traditions reviewed in this paper illustrates: Quantitative
research, qualitative content analysis, grounded theory and
social-science hermeneutics all make a strong argument that
social theory is absolutely necessary for guiding the research
process2. In order to establish how social theory and empirical
research should be linked, one first has to define what “social
theory” actually is (Kalthoff, 2008). This is important as theories
differ in their level of abstraction and at least three types of
theories can be distinguished (Lindemann, 2008; Baur, 2009c;
Baur and Ernst, 2011):
1. Social Theories (“Sozialtheorien”), such as analytical sociology,
systems theory, communicative constructivism, actor network
theory or figurational sociology, contain general concepts
about what society is, which concepts are central to analysis
(e.g., actions, interactions, communication), what the nature
of reality is, what assumptions have to be made in order to
grasp this reality and how—on this basis—theory and data can
be linked on a general level.
2. Middle-range theories (“Theorien begrenzter Reichweite”)
concentrate on a specific thematic field, a historical period and
a geographical region. They model social processes just for
this socio-historical context. For example, Esping-Andersen’s
(1990) model of welfare regimes argues that there have been
typical patterns of welfare development in Western European
and Northern American societies since about the 1880s. In
contrast, in their study “Awareness of Dying”, Glaser and
Strauss (1975), address topics of medical sociology and claim
2To clarify a common misconception of qualitative research: When qualitative
researchers demand that research should be ‘open-ended’ (‘Offenheit’), they do not
mean that they are not using theory but that they are using an inductive analytical
stance (see below).
to have identified typical patterns that are valid for the U.S. in
the 1960s and 1970s.
3. Theories of Society (“Gesellschaftstheorien”) try to characterize
complete societies by integrating results from various studies
to a larger theoretical picture, e.g., “Capitalism”, “Functionally
Differentiated Society,” “Modernity,” and “Postmodernity.”
In other words, theories of society build on middle-range
theories and further abstract them. Middle-range theories
and theories of society are closely entwined as an analysis
of social reality demands “a permanent control of empirical
studies by theory and vice versa a permanent review of
these theories via empirical results” (Elias, 1987, p. 63). For
example, in figurational sociology, the objective is to focus
and advance sociological hypotheses and syntheses of isolated
findings for the development of a “theory of the increasing
social differentiation” (Elias, 1997, p. 369), of planned and
unplanned social processes, and of integration and functional
differentiation (Baur and Ernst, 2011).
These types of theories are entwined in a very typical way during
the research process. Namely, all social science methodologies
are constructed in a way that social theory is used to build,
test and advance middle-range theories and theories of society
(Lindemann, 2008; Baur, 2009c). Therefore, social theory is a
prerequisite for social research as it helps researchers decide
which data they need andwhich analysis procedure is appropriate
for answering their research question (Baur, 2005, 2008). Social
theory also allows researchers to link middle-range theories and
theories of society with both methodology and research practice,
as not all theories can make use of all research methods and
data types (Baur, 2008). For example, rational choice theory
needs data on individuals’ thoughts and behavior, symbolic
interactionism needs data on interactions, i.e., what is going on
between individuals.
Due to the importance given to social theory, it is unsurprising
that all research traditions stress that the theoretical perspective
needs to be disclosed by explicating the study’s social theoretical
frame and defining central terms and terminology at the
beginning of the research process (Weil et al., 2008). The dispute
between the four methodological traditions discussed in this
paper is whether one needs to have a specific middle-range
theory in mind at the beginning of the research process or not.
In quantitative research, specifying one or more middle-range
theories in advance is necessary in order to formulate hypotheses
to be tested. The opposing point of view is that of grounded
theory which explicitly aims at developing new middle-range
theories for new research topics and therefore by nature cannot
have any middle-range theory in mind at the beginning of the
research process. Qualitative content analysis and social-science
hermeneutics are someway in between these extreme positions.
All in all, explicating one’s social theoretical stance is a major
measure against partiality, as assumptions are explicated and thus
can be criticized. All research traditions analyzed for this paper
also agree on a second measure against partiality: self-reflection.
In addition, each research tradition has developed distinct
methodologies in order to handle subjectivity and perspectivity, i.e.,
in order to avoid partiality crawling back in via the backdoor.
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In the tradition of critical rationalism (Popper, 1935),
quantitative research systematically aims at falsification. Ideally,
different middle-range theories and hypotheses compete and are
tested against each other. For example, survey methodology
typically tries to test middle-range theories, meaning that at
the beginning of the research process not only the general
social theory but also middle-range theories must be known and
clarified as well as possible. Then, these theories typically are
formulated into hypotheses, which then are operationalized and
can be falsified during the research process. This idea of testing
theories can be seen in two typical ways of doing so:
(a) One can use statistical tests to falsify hypotheses.
(b) The other way of testing theories in quantitative research is
using different middle-range theories and see which theory
fits the data best.
Qualitative research has repeatedly stated that the point about
qualitative research is that very often, no middle range theory
exists (which would be needed for testing theories), and the aim
of qualitative research is exactly to build these middle range
theories. Therefore, inmost qualitative research processes, testing
theories with data is not a workable solution. Instead, qualitative
research has suggested “triangulation” of theories, methods,
researchers and data (Flick, 1992, 2017; Seale, 1999, pp. 51–72)
as an alternative. Note that the idea of triangulating theories in
qualitative research is very similar to the idea of testing theories
against each other in quantitative research. But in contrast to
quantitative research, in qualitative research theories are not
necessarily spelled out in advance but instead are built during
data analysis. Note also, that the idea that different researchers
address the same problem with different data is also equal to the
way quantitative research is organized in practice: In the ideal
quantitative research process, each single study is just a small
pebble in the overall mosaic, to be published e.g., in an academic
paper. Then other researchers (e.g., from different institutions)
can use other data (e.g., from a different data set) and see how
well these fit the theory, i.e., they try to replicate results of the
primary study, and the results of various replications can be then
summarized in a meta-analysis (Weiß and Wagner, 2019).
In addition, qualitative content analysis has a strong tradition
of handling researchers’ perspectivity, not only by triangulating
them but in fact by using different researchers to code in parallel
e.g. the interview data and then comparing these codings. This
procedure works better, the more dissimilar the researchers
are concerning disciplinary, theoretical, methodological, political
and socio-structural background, as contrasting researchers
likely have also very different perspectives on the topic. If two
such researchers independently coded the same text passages
similarly, hopefully perspectivity can be ruled out. In contrast,
if the same passages are coded differently by two persons, then
one must interpret and take a closer look on how researchers’
subjectivity and perspectivity might have influenced the coding
process. All in all, qualitative content analysis makes use of
research teams in a way that researchers first work independently
and then results are compared. Note that this is similar to the way
modern survey research works in practice: Here, questionnaires
are typically developed and tested in teams, following the concept
of the “Survey Life Cycle” (Groves et al., 2009), and a main means
of evaluating survey questions is expert validation by other,
external researchers. Similar, during data analysis, it is typical for
quantitative researchers to re-analyze data that have already been
analyzed by other teams. This is one of the reasons why archiving
and documenting data is good-practice in survey methodology.
Social-science hermeneutics, too, have a strong tradition
of researchers working together, but this co-operation and
reciprocal control is organized in a different way: In contrast
to qualitative content analysis and survey research (where
researchers first work independently and then results are
compared), the order of co-operation and independent research
is reversed in social-science hermeneutics: The research team is
used at the beginning of data analysis in so-called “data sessions”
(“Datensitzungen”) (Reichertz, 2018). The team focusses on
one section of the text and does a so-called “fine-grained
analysis” (“Feinanalyse”). During these data sessions, the
research teams collectively develops different interpretations
or “readings” (“Lesarten”) (Kurt and Herbrik, 2019). In
fact, these interpretations resemble hypothesis formation in
quantitative research, and the following analysis steps also
strongly resemble quantitative research, as after the data session,
researchers can individually or collectively test the hypotheses (=
interpretations). However, in hermeneutics, interpretations are
not tested using statistical tests but using “sequential analysis”
(“Sequenzanalyse”). During sequential analysis, the text is used
as material for testing the hypotheses developed during data
sessions: If an interpretation holds true, there should be other
hints in the data that point to that interpretation, while other
interpretations might be falsified by additional data (Lamnek,
2005, pp. 211–230, 531–546; Kurt and Herbrik, 2019).
Grounded theory handles subjectivity differently in so far that
it has developed different procedures for theoretically grounding
the research process and for building theoretical sensitivity
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990). The starting point of discussions
on theoretical sensitivity is that researchers—being human—
cannot help but entering the field not only with their social
theoretical perspective but also with their everyday knowledge
and prejudices which may bias both their observations and their
interpretations. This may also mislead researchers to gloss over
inconsistencies or interesting points in their data too fast. Note
that the problem formulated here is very similar to the idea of
the “investigator bias” in experimental research. In order to tackle
this tendency for misinterpretation, grounded theory states that
researchers need to develop theoretical sensitivity, i.e., “to enter
the research setting with as few predetermined ideas as possible
(. . . ). In this posture, the analyst is able to remain sensitive to
the data by being able to record events and detect happenings
without first having them filtered through and squared with pre-
existing hypotheses and biases” (Glaser, 1978, p. 2–3). In order to
develop and uphold this open-mindedness for new ideas, Strauss
and Corbin (1990) suggest a number of specific procedures such
as systematically asking questions or analyzing words, phrases
and sentences. Grounded theory also suggests many ways of
systematic comparisons such as “flip flop techniques,” “systematic
comparison” and so on. Another modus operandi suggested is
“raising the red flag.” These techniques for increasing theoretical
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sensitivity are meant as procedures that can be used if researchers
are working on their own and do not have a team of coders who
can code in parallel.
Summing up the argument so far, all qualitative and
quantitative approaches analyzed suggest a strong use of social
theory. Social theory transforms partiality into perspectivity by
focusing on some aspects of (social) reality which then guide
the research process. This necessarily creates blind spots. The
difference between unreflected subjectivity and social theory
is that by using social theory, blind spots are explicated.
Consequently, both their assumptions and consequences can
be discussed and criticized. All research traditions also have
developed further methodologies in order to handle perspectivity
in research practice. Two common ideas are working in
teams and testing ideas that have been developed in earlier
research. Regardless of research tradition, for these suggestions
of using research teams for controlling partiality and handling
perspectivity to be effective, it is necessary for the team members
to be both knowledgeable about the topic and as different as
possible concerning biographical experience (e.g., gender, age,
disability, ethnicity, social status etc.) and theoretical stance. Note
that none of these countermeasures guarantee impartiality—they
just help to better handle it.
ACHIEVING INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND
MEANING OF OBJECTIVITY
So far, I have argued that one way to address the distinction
between “positivism” and “constructivism” is the issue of how
to handle a researcher’s subjectivity by transforming it into
perspectivity, which in turnmakes the specific blind spots created
by a researcher’s theoretical perspective obvious and opens
them for theoretical and methodological reflexion. However,
“positivism” and “constructivism” do not only address the
relation of social science research to a researcher’s personal,
subjective perspective but also to the issue of how to achieve
intersubjectivity—in other words, how to make research as
“objective” as possible in order to be able to distinguish more and
less valid research. In this sense, perspectivity is closely linked to
the concept of “objectivity.”
Now, the debate on “objectivity” is a complicated issue, as the
comparison of the four research traditions (quantitative research,
qualitative content analysis, grounded theory, and social-science
hermeneutics) reveals:
First of all, it is not clear at all what “objectivity”
means in different research traditions. In quantitative research,
“objectivity” and “intersubjectivity” are used synonymously and
mean that independent researchers studying the same social
phenomenon always come to the same results, as long as the
social phenomenon remains stable. This concept of objectivity
has consequences on the typical way quantitative inquiries are
designed: The wish to ensure that researchers can actually
independently come to the same result is the main reason why
quantitative research tries to standardize everything that can be
possibly standardized, as can be exemplified by survey research:
sampling (random sampling), the measurement instruments
(questionnaires), data collection (interviewer training, interview
situation) as well as data analysis (statistics) (Baur et al., 2018).
The idea is that by standardization, it does not matter who
does the research and results become replicable. Qualitative
content analysis tries to copy these procedures by techniques such
as parallel coding discussed above. Other examples of aiming
at getting as close to objectivity as possible are concepts like
intercoder reliability.
However, this aim at achieving objectivity by controlling
any effect a researcher’s subjectivity might have on the research
process does not work in practice at all: Despite all attempts
of standardization, quantitative researchers have to make many
theoretical and practical decisions during the research process
and therefore interpret their data and results (Baur et al., 2018).
This is true for all stages of the research process, starting
from focussing the research question (Baur, 2008) to designing
instruments and data collection (Kelle, 2018), data analysis
(Akremi, 2018; Baur, 2018) and generalization using inductive
statistics (Ziegler, 2018). In this sense, all quantitative research
is “interpretative” as well (Knoblauch et al., 2018)—a fact, that
is hidden by terminology: While qualitative research talks about
“interpretation”, quantitative research talks about “error”, but
this basically means the same, i.e., that regardless how much
researchers might try, social reality cannot be “objectively”
grasped by researchers. Instead, there is always a gap between
what is represented in the data and what is “truly” happening
(Baur and Knoblauch, 2018; Baur et al., 2018).
In order to react to this problem, within the quantitative
paradigm, survey research has developed the concept of the
“Total Survey Error” (TSE) in the last two decades (Groves
et al., 2009). The key argument is that various types of errors
might occur during the research process, and these various
errors are often related in the sense that—if you reduce one
error type—another error increases. For example, in order to
minimize measurement error, it is typically recommended to
ask many different and detailed questions, a classical example
being a psychological test for diagnosis of mental disorders,
which usually takes more than 1 hour to answer and is very
precise. However, these kinds of questionnaires could not be used
in surveys of the general population, as respondents typically
are only willing to spend a limited time on answering survey
questions. If the survey is too long, they will either outright
decline to participate in the survey or drop out during processing
the survey—which in turn results in unit or item nonresponse.
Therefore, researchers typically ask fewer questions in surveys,
which increases the likelihood of measurement error. In this
example, there is a trade-off between measurement error (due
to short questionnaires) and nonresponse error (due to long
questionnaires). The other error types are likewise related.
Therefore—while traditionally, these various errors were handled
individually—modern survey methodology tries to incorporate
them into one concept—the “Total Survey Error.” This means
that researchers should take into account all errors and try
to minimize the error as a whole. However, as errors can
only be minimized and never completely deleted, logically,
there will always remain a gap between “objective reality” and
“measurement.” In other words, in research practice, survey
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methodology has long abolished the idea that it is possible to
“objectively” measure reality. Instead, there might always be a
difference between what truly happens and what the data convey
(Baur, 2014, pp. 260–262).
The discussion about the Total Survey Error already suggests
that trying to achieve “objectivity”—in the sense that everybody
who does research may achieve the same result, if the research
process is well-organized—only works to a specific point. While
quantitative research tries to come as close to this goal as possible,
there are many fields of social reality, where the attempt of
achieving objectivity via standardization faces huge difficulties.
Examples are cross-cultural and comparative research (Baur,
2014) and fields characterized by rapid social change (Kelle, 2017)
because here concepts are not stable across contexts.
Based on these observations, most qualitative research
traditions argue that a concept of objectivity in the quantitative
sense does not make sense either for qualitative research or not
at all—because it is never possible to achieve, as many social
contexts are changing very fast and in fact so fast that it is
difficult to build middle range theories that can be tested, as the
object of researchmight have already changed before a researcher
can replicate the study. In turn, most qualitative researchers
define “objectivity” differently. For example, in social-science
hermeneutics, “objectivity” means that researchers should reflect,
document and explain how they arrived at their conclusions, i.e.,
how they collected and interpreted data (Lamnek, 2005, pp. 59–
77). Seale (1999, pp. 141–158) calls this “reflexive methodological
accounting.” The idea is that this makes it possible to criticize
and validate research. While this is a more basic concept of
“objectivity,” this is a concept that all researchers (including
quantitative researchers) can agree on.
While I have, firstly, shown that “objectivity” can mean very
different things, it is also, secondly, an oversimplification to
claim that all quantitative researchers believe that “objectivity” (in
the sense of the quantitative paradigm) can be actually achieved
and that all qualitative researchers disbelieve this. As stated
above, many quantitative researchers have long-ago given up
the idea that there can be a “true,” “objective” measurement of
reality. Moreover, there are many qualitative researchers who
actually believe that “objectivity” (in the sense of the quantitative
paradigm) can be achieved, and this believe in the possibility
of “true measurement” can be found in all research traditions
(Baur et al., 2018), e.g., within qualitative content analysis,
Mayring (2014) does believe in “objectivity,” Kuckartz (2014)
does not and takes a more interpretative stance. Similarly, within
the hermeneutical tradition, Oevermann et al. (1979) as well
as Wernet (2006) believe in “objectivity,” Maiwald (2018) and
Herbrik (2018) take a more interpretative stance. All in all, the
picture is much more complicated than it seems on first sight—
something that is definitively worth exploring in more detail in
future research.
FOCUSING THE RESEARCH QUESTION
A consequence of the above discussion is that all social science
methodology needs to make strong use of social theory in order
to guide a researcher’s perspective, in other words: Research
questions need to be focused and in fact, research becomes
better, if and when it is focused, as it allows researchers to
consciously collect and analyze exactly the data they need
in order to answer the question. As I have shown in Baur
(2009c, pp. 197–206), one can use social theory for focusing,
and the research question has to be focused at least concerning
four dimensions: (1) action sphere, (2) analysis level, (3)
spatiality and (4) temporality with the two sub-dimensions
(4a) pattern in time and duration. In additions, researchers
have to decide, if there are interactions both within and
between these dimensions, e.g., between long-term and short-
term developments or between space and time. As a rule of
thumb, if one wants to explore one of these dimensions in
detail, it is advisable to reduce as much complexity for the other
dimensions as possible.
While this need for focusing the research question is
something that quantitative research, qualitative content analysis,
grounded theory and social-science hermeneutics would agree
on, they differ on the question, when the research question
is focused:
Both quantitative research, qualitative content analysis and
social-science hermeneutics formulate the research question as
precisely as possible at the beginning of the analysis in order to
know what types of data need to be collected and analyzed.
Quantitative research needs to know e.g., what kinds of questions
to ask in a questionnaire, and in order to be able do this,
researchers need to know what they want to know. Similarly,
social-science hermeneutics need to know which text passage is
especially theoretical relevant and thus worthy of being analyzed
in the first data session—usually, only a single or a few sentences
are selected, and in order to do this selection, researchers, too,
need to know what they want to know. While qualitative content
analysis usually collects open-ended data such as interview data
or documents, a (for qualitative research) relatively large amount
of similarly types of e.g., interviews or documents is collected,
and data collection is often divided up between team members—
again, in order to be fruitful, this is only possible, if researchers,
know what they want to know.
In contrast, grounded theory opposes this early focusing,
arguing that researchers might miss the most innovative or
important points of their research, if they focus too early,
especially, if they enter a new research field they know very little
about. Instead, grounded theory suggests that researchers should
start with a very general research question at the beginning of the
analysis, which is focused during data analysis. In order to enable
a focusing grounded in data, grounded theory has developed an
own technique for focusing the research process: selective coding
(Corbin and Strauss, 1990).
Among other things, this has effects on the way social
research results are written up, e.g., in a paper or book: While
in quantitative research, qualitative content analysis and social-
science hermeneutics, researchers can more or less decide how
their text will be organized after they have focused their question,
in grounded theory, the order of analysis and the order of writing
may largely differ—deciding on how the final argument should
be structured is an important part of selective coding and can
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FIGURE 1 | Induction, deduction, and abduction.
only be decided on relatively late during research, i.e., after the
research question has been focused.
BEGINNING THE RESEARCH PROCESS:
DEDUCTION, INDUCTION AND
ABDUCTION
These ideas of how social theory is used for handling objectivity
and perspectivity as well as when and how the research
question should be focused, strongly influence how the overall
research process is designed. Concerning this overall design,
the difference between qualitative and quantitative research
seems clear:
In current methodological discourse, it is generally assumed
that quantitative research is deductive. As depicted in Figure 1,
“deduction” means that researchers start research by deriving
hypotheses concerning the research from the selected theory.
Researchers then collect and analyze data, in order to test their
hypotheses (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948).
In contrast, it is generally assumed that qualitative research
systematically makes use of inductivism. As illustrated in
Figure 1, “induction” starts from the data and then analyses
which theory would best fit the data (Strauss and Corbin, 1990).
This simple distinction is another oversimplification in
several ways:
First, the idea of induction and deductions has been
supplemented by idea of “abduction” (Peirce, 1878/1931;
Reichertz, 2004b, 2010, 2013), which resembles induction in the
sense that both start analysis from data and conclude from data to
theory (in contrast to deduction). However, induction only draws
on existing theories—if no theory is known that fits or can model
the data analysis, induction fails. Researchers can only invent
[sic!] a new theory—and this is called abduction (Reichertz,
2004b, 2010, 2013). Grounded theory (Corbin and Strauss, 1990)
and social-science hermeneutics (Reichertz, 2004b, 2010, 2013)
are the only of the four research traditions which explicitly stress
the necessity and importance of abduction, especially as it is the
only way of really creating new knowledge. However, in research
practice, all researchers in all research traditions need to work
abductively at some point, e.g., when they study a completely new
social phenomenon (where no prior knowledge can exist).
Secondly, no actual research process is purely deductive,
inductive or abductive:
– In actual research processes, what usually happens when
researchers start their research deductively, is that they build
a theory, collect and test data—and then research results
differ from what was expected. This does not mean that the
researcher made a mistake or that research is “bad”—on the
contrary: If one assumes that only research questions that can
actually yield new results are worthy of being explored, then
it is to be expected that results differ from what researchers
have deduced from their data. Similarly, if one truly tries to
falsify data, it must be possible that the data can actually
contradict the theory. The point for the debate about induction
and deduction is that researchers usually never end analysis
here. Instead, they will take a closer look at the data, re-analyze
them and look for other explanations for their results, i.e.,
they will check, if a different theory than the one considered
originally might fit the data better. In the moment they are
doing this, they change from the logic of deduction to the logic
of induction.
– Likewise, if researchers start data analysis inductively, this
means that they start interpreting the data and muse, if
there is any theory that might fit the data. Once they have
identified theories in line with the data, researchers usually go
on testing these theories by using further data. An example
is the sequence of data sessions and sequence analysis in
social-science hermeneutics discussed above. However, in the
moment researchers start testing their hypothesis, they have
switched from induction to deduction.
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– Similarly, if researchers start abductively, after abduction, they
have a theory that can be tested by deduction.
In further research, researchers will typically switch from
induction to deduction and back several time, regardless which
paradigm they work with. So in principle, all social science
research makes use of both induction and deduction. If the existing
theories do not fit the data, researchers will additionally make use
of abduction.
Rather, the difference between the traditions lies is how they
begin research:
Quantitative researchers have no choice but to start
deductively as they need to know what standardized data
they need to collect (e.g., which questions to ask in a survey)
and which population the random sample needs to be drawn
from—and in order to do so, they need to exactly know what
they want to know, i.e., which hypothesis to test. While this
is often depicted as an advantage, it is actually a problem
when researchers are analyzing unfamiliar fields or if social
phenomena are so new that researchers do not know, which
theory is appropriate for answering the question.
As suggested by the discussion so far, social-science
hermeneutics and grounded theory usually start with induction
and then later switch to deduction: Grounded theory specifically
aims at building theories for unfamiliar fields, which is exactly
one of the reasons why the research question is focused only later
in research. In contrast, social-science hermeneutics focus the
research question early but only develop hypotheses inductively
from the material during data sessions. This illustrates that the
logics of deduction and induction are not necessarily linked to
the issue when and how the research question is focused.
In contrast, qualitative content analysis also starts deductively.
This shows that the simple idea that qualitative research uses
induction and quantitative research uses deduction cannot be
upheld. On the contrary, there is some qualitative research that
starts deductively while other qualitative research might start
inductively. Regardless of the logic of beginning, qualitative and
quantitative research will swap between the logics in the course
of the further research process.
LINEARITY AND CIRCULARITY
CONCERNING THE ORDER OF RESEARCH
PHASES
The question, if the research process is deductive or inductive
is often mingled with the question, if the research process is
linear or circular. However, these are not the same things:
“Deduction” and “induction” describe ways of linking theory and
data. “Linearity” and “circularity” address the issue, how different
research phases are ordered, namely, if (a) posing and focusing
the research question; (b) sampling; (c) designing instruments;
(d) collecting data; (e) preparing data; (f) analyzing data; (g)
generalizing results; and (h) archiving data follow one after the
other (“linearity”), or if they are iterated (“circularity”). Again,
it is generally assumed that quantitative research is organized
in a linear way, while qualitative research is organized in a
circular way.
Indeed, quantitative research is and always has to be organized
in a linear way. This is a direct result of the quantitative
concept of objectivity, deduction in combination with the idea
of making use of numbers: As stated above, in order to ensure
that researchers influence the research process as little as possible
but also in order to enable a strong division of labor, research
instruments are developed using a prescribed order. Many
quantitative techniques do not work, if one deviates from this
model. For example, in order to generalize results using inductive
statistics, the sample has to be a random sample. A sample is
only random, if a population is defined first, then the sample
is randomly drawn from this population, and only then data
are collected and all units drawn actually participate. If there
is unit or item nonresponse, there might be a systematic error
(meaning that the sample becomes a nonprobability sample
and thus making it impossible to use inductive statistics for
generalization). Recruiting additional cases later does not resolve
this problem because it contradicts the logic of random sampling
(Baur and Florian, 2008; Baur et al., 2018). All in all, this means
that both sampling and the development of the instrument must
be conducted before data collection. Then, all data must be
collected and thereafter analyzed in a bunch. So, the logics of
trying to formulate the hypotheses as standardized as possible has
the result that quantitative research must be linear in the sense of
research phases being organized step-by-step.
Although the need of linearity sometimes is depicted as an
advantage, the contrary is true: Often, linearity is a problem
because very often, researchers only realize during the actual
research that they have made mistakes or false assumptions
or forgotten important aspects of the phenomenon under
investigation. In circular research processes, these can be easily
corrected. However, in linear research processes, this is not
possible without setting up a whole new study. That this
is not just a general statement but an actual problem that
quantitative researchers perceive themselves is reflected in the
fact that psychometrics has been using iterative processes of
item generation, testing and selection as established practice
for several decades. In the last two decades, sociological survey
methodologists, too, have tried to derive asmuch as possible from
linearity by developing the concept of the “Survey Life Cycle”
(Groves et al., 2009). While in traditional survey methodology,
sampling and instrument development were subsequent phases,
now at least during instrument development, feedback loops
are built in. Panel and trend designs even allow for making
slight adjustments both of the instruments and the sample after
data analysis in later waves. Regardless, a true circularity is
not possible in the logic of quantitative research processes—in
principle, the research process concerning the order of building
instruments, sampling, data collection and data analysis is linear.
Linearity is also a characteristic of qualitative content
analysis, which starts with sampling and collecting data
(for example by conducting interviews or sampling texts),
then preparing them in a qualitative data analysis software,
coding them and afterwards structuring the data. In social-
science hermeneutics, too, the overall research process is
linear in the sense that usually first data are collected, then
transcribed and then analyzed. Similar to survey research, both
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qualitative content analysis and social-science hermeneutics
might build circular elements into the research process later,
e.g., by collecting more data or sampling new cases—still,
all in all, all these research processes remain linear in
nature, which contrasts common-sense knowledge on qualitative
data analysis.
Of the four research traditions analyzed, the only research
process truly circular is that of grounded theory. In fact,
grounded theory argues most explicitly that linearity is inefficient
because a lot of time is wasted on things researchers relatively
soon realize they do not need to know and because linearity forces
researchers to spend a lot of time before they can actually get
started. Thus, grounded theory not only propagates circularity
but has also developed suggestions of how to organize this
circularity in research practice. In this regard, the key concept
is “theoretical sampling,” which states that researchers should
start analysis as soon as possible with one single case. The
first case sampled is ideally the critical case (i.e., a case that
should not exist in theory but exists empirically) or the case
from which researchers can learn the most given their current
understanding. Then data for this case only are collected and
immediately analyzed. Depending on what has been learned
from the first case, researchers select the second case that likely
contrasts the most with the first case. This process is based
on the idea that one can learn more from new cases, if they
provide as different information as possible. Then data are
collected only for the second case and analyzed immediately,
then a third contrasting case is selected and so on, until results
are “theoretically saturated,” i.e., no new ideas or information
arises. Theoretical sampling not only allows for developing and
adjusting the sampling plan during data analysis but also allows
to change the data collection or analysis methods used. For
example, researchers could start with qualitative interviews and
then later change to ethnography or other kinds of data which
will be analyzed. So all in all, given the ways in which the research
phases follow each other, it is only grounded theory that differs
from the other traditions.
LINEARITY AND CIRCULARITY
CONCERNING DATA ANALYSIS
The distinction between linear and circular research processes
becomes completely blurred when looking at data analysis. On
paper, all qualitative traditions discussed in this paper openly
build in circular elements into their data analysis: Researchers
using qualitative content analysis conduct different rounds
coding the data. Grounded theory, as stated above, as a matter of
principle does not only change between different phases of data
collection but also differentiates between open, axial and selective
coding. Hermeneutics are also circular in the sense that once the
different interpretations are developed, the material is tested in
different ways.
Quantitative data analysis seems to be completely different,
on first sight, as it appears to be linear: If you follow the
textbook, quantitative researchers should develop hypotheses
at the beginning of the research process, then design their
instruments, plan how to analyze them, sample, collect and
prepare data. Next, researchers will use statistics to test the
hypotheses—and until this step, good quantitative research
practice also follows the book.
However, as stated above, what usually happens is that
researchers do not achieve the results as expected—and in fact,
this is a desirable result, because otherwise research would never
produce new insights, and in the sense of quantitative logics, it
should be possible to falsify results.
TABLE 1 | Commonalities and differences between research traditions concerning some aspects of the research process.
Quantitative Research Qualitative Content Analysis Grounded Theory Social-Science Hermeneutics
Handling perspectivity Perspectivity is a necessary part of the research process and has to be disclosed at the beginning of the research process by
explicating the study’s theoretical frame and defining central terms and terminology.
Aiming at falsification by testing
theories and hypothesis
Triangulation (methods, data, theories, researchers)
Parallel coding Theoretical sensitivity Interpretation groups
Meaning of objectivity Ideally, different independent
researchers should arrive at the
same conclusion.
Objectivity in the sense of quantitative researchers is not possible in the social sciences. Instead,
researchers should reflect, document and explain how they arrived at their conclusions.
Focusing the research
question
As precisely as possible at the
beginning of the analysis
As precisely as possible at the
beginning of the analysis
Very general research question
at beginning of analysis which is
focused during selective coding
As precisely as possible at the
beginning of the analysis
Beginning the research process Deductive Deductive Inductive Inductive
Order of research phases Linear Linear Circular (Theoretical Sampling) Linear
Data analysis In theory linear, in practice
circular
Circular Circular Circular
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Still, have you ever read a paper that said “I have done an
analysis and did not get the results I wanted or expected . . . so
I am finished now! Sorry!” or “I have falsified my hypotheses and
now we do not know anything because what we thought we knew
has been falsified”?
That you have very likely never read a paper like this, is
because quantitative data analysis is not as strictly deductive-
linear as it pretends to be in methods textbooks. But in
fact, quantitative data analysis is much more organized in
a circular way, similar to the qualitative research traditions.
More specifically, when quantitative researchers do not achieve
the results they expected, they switch to induction and/or
abduction—data analysis now becomes circular in the sense
that researchers analyze the dataset in different rounds. After
the first round of unexpected results, researchers might e.g.,
either conduct a more detailed analysis of a specific variable or
subgroup which is more interesting, or they might use different
statistical procedures to find clues why the results were different
than expected. The only difference to qualitative research is
that quantitative researchers have to limit their analysis to the
data they have—if information is not contained in the data set,
they would need to conduct a whole new study. Regardless, the
important point for this paper is that—while the overall research
process can be either organized in a linear or circular way, during
data analysis, all social science research is organized in a circular
way in research practice, whether researchers admit this or not.
DISCUSSION
In this paper, I have shown how four research traditions
(quantitative research, qualitative content analysis, grounded
theory, social-science hermeneutics) handle six issues to be
resolved when deciding on a social science research design,
namely: How is researchers’ perspectivity handled during the
research process? How can intersubjectivity be achieved, and
what does “objectivity” mean in this context? When and how
is the research question is focused? Does the research process
start deductively or inductively? Are the diverse research phases
(sampling, data collection, data preparation, data analysis)
organized in a linear or circular way? Is data analysis organized in
a linear or circular way? For each of these issues, I have discussed
how the four traditions resemble and differ from each other.
Table 1 sums up the various positions.
When regarding the whole picture depicted in Table 1, it
is possible to state that the common-sense knowledge that
“quantitative research” organizes its research process deductively,
tests theories, does objective, positivist research and organizes
the research process in a linear way while “qualitative research”
organizes its research process inductively, develops theories, has
a constructivist stance on research and organizes the research
process in a circular way, cannot be upheld for at least
three reasons:
1. Quantitative research is not as objective, deductive and linear
as it is often depicted in literature. It is much more necessary to
interpret in all phases of quantitative research as quantitative
researchers usually admit. During data analysis, quantitative
research has always iterated between deduction, induction and
abduction, and concerning the overall organization of the
research process, quantitative research has recently tried to
dissolve linearity as much as possible, as exemplified in the
concept of the “Survey Life Cycle.”
2. For all these issues, there are some qualitative traditions
that resemble quantitative research more than quantitative
research. As this is not a new revelation, the distinction
between “qualitative” and “qualitative” research has often
been depicted as continuum, resulting in an order (from
strong “quantitativeness” to strong “qualitativeness”) from
quantitative methods, qualitative content analysis, grounded
theory and social-science hermeneutics. The general argument
is that qualitative content analysis is “almost” quantitative
research, while social-science hermeneutics is one of the
“truest” forms of qualitative research.
3. However, neither can a continuum between qualitative and
quantitative research be upheld, i.e., one can neither claim
that qualitative content analysis is per se closer to quantitative
research than social-science hermeneutics nor is grounded
theory positioned in the middle. Rather, depending on the
debated issue concerning the research process, social-science
hermeneutics might resemble quantitative research much
more than qualitative content analysis. For example, while it
is true that both quantitative research and qualitative content
analysis organize the overall research process more linearly
than grounded theory and social-science hermeneutics do,
when it comes to handling theory, social-science hermeneutics
are “stricter” than the other two qualitative traditions in the
sense that they systematically test theories.
To conclude, the oversimplified distinction between “qualitative”
and “quantitative” research cannot be upheld. This is both a
chance and a challenge for mixed methods research. On the
bright sight, mixing and combining qualitative and quantitative
methods becomes easier because the distinction is not as
grand as it seems at first sight and the boundaries between
research traditions are much more blurred. It thus might
be easier to focus on practical issues of mixing instead of
epistemological debates. On the dark sight, mixing becomes
more difficult because some tricky issues of mixing specific
types of methods are usually not addressed in current mixed
methods discourse. More specifically, mixed methods research
so far has strongly focussed on mixing traditions that can be
easily mixed due to some similarities in the research process,
e.g., quantitative research and qualitative content analysis.
When the discussion presented here is taken seriously, it
would be much more fruitful to discuss how to combine
quantitative research e.g., with grounded theory and social-
science hermeneutics because in these traditions the research
process is more circular and this circularity is part of their
strength. To effectively use the potential of these paradigms,
it would be necessary to implement these circular elements in
mixed methods research.
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